Abstract. Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2 t steps gives a theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving IND-CCA security? We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small constant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while retaining the minimal overhead.
Introduction

Background
Motivation. Ever since Goldwasser and Micali introduced the concept of "probabilistic encryption" [15] it is well understood that every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into their ciphertexts in order to achieve semantic security. Thus a ciphertext c must be longer than the embedded message m and the difference oh := |c| − |m| is called the ciphertext overhead. In order to achieve stronger security properties, the ciphertext overhead tends to be even larger due to the use of extended randomness or extra integrity checking mechanisms. In this paper we are asking for the minimal possible ciphertext overhead to protect against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security).
A Generic Lower Bound. A ciphertext overhead of oh bits means that at most oh bits of randomness can be incorporated into a ciphertext. A brute-force adversary in the IND-CPA experiment can exhaustively search for the randomness used for the challenge ciphertext. After encrypting one of the challenge messages up to 2 t times, it has an advantage of Ω(2 t /2 oh ). Requiring the advantage to be smaller than 2 −ε (and ignoring small additive constants), it must hold that oh ≥ t + ε . Accordingly, t + ε bits are a lower bound on the ciphertext overhead with respect to adversaries running in 2 t steps and having a success probability of at most 2 −ε , by counting encryption as one step. (We refer to Section 2 for a more formal treatment.) We say that the ciphertext overhead is optimal if it matches the lower bound up to a (small) constant term, i.e., if oh ≤ t + ε + O (1) . Since every IND-CPA adversary is also an IND-CCA adversary, the above lower bound also applies to IND-CCA secure schemes.
For a number of schemes the ciphertext overhead primarily depends on the size of the underlying number-theoretic primitive, which often suffers from more sophisticated attacks. For example,
Scheme
Ciphertext
Assumption #Feistel Overhead on TDP rounds OAEP [3, 14] oh ≤ 3t + 2ε SPD-OW 2 OAEP+ [24] oh ≤ 3t + 2ε OW 2 PSS-E [9] oh ≤ 2t + 2ε SPD-OW 2 PSP2 S-Pad [13] oh ≤ 2t + 2ε OW 4 OAEP-3R [22] oh ≤ 2t + ε OW 3 OAEP-4X (ours) oh = t + ε OW 4 Table 1 . Upper bounds on the ciphertext overhead (up to small additive constants) in OAEP variants for (2 ε , 2 −t )-adversaries. The lower bound is oh ≥ t + ε. OW: one-wayness. SPD-OW: set partial domain one-wayness.
ciphertexts of ElGamal-type schemes contain at least one group element of overhead which must be longer than 2t + ε bits due to the generic square-root bounds on the discrete-logarithm problem. Hence, the ciphertext overhead of such schemes can never match the generic lower bound.
Upper Bounds from Existing Schemes. Among the cryptosystems based on trapdoor permutations, there are ones whose ciphertext overhead is essentially independent of the size of the underlying permutation. We focus on such schemes for the rest of the paper. An example with optimal ciphertext overhead is the basic version of OAEP [3] , which omits the zero padding and therefore only offers IND-CPA security. Considering IND-CCA security, however, OAEP loses its optimal ciphertext overhead as exemplified in Section 2.2. On the other hand, concrete security proofs for existing schemes provide upper bounds on the ciphertext overhead with which the desired level of security is attained. Table 1 summarizes the ciphertext overhead of existing schemes. Its content is discussed in the rest of this section.
IND-CCA Security via Validity Checking. As in OAEP, a common approach [24, 18, 20, 9, 19, 13 ] to achieve IND-CCA security is to attach a deterministic validity string (such as zero-padding or a hash of the message, etc) to the message (or the ciphertext) so that decryption can verify and reject almost all invalid ciphertexts. The ciphertext overhead is thus determined by the size of the randomness and the validity string. OAEP and the schemes in [24, 18] require randomness of 2t + ε bits plus a validity string of t + ε bits. (See Section 2.2 for details on how to compute these values.) Their ciphertext overhead is thus oh = 3t + 2ε. The schemes in [9, 13] have a better security reduction and achieve oh = 2t + 2ε, which seems the best one can expect as long as encryption incorporates a validity string into the ciphertexts.
Validity-free Encryption. A considerable step towards minimizing the ciphertext overhead was the validity-free approach introduced by Phan and Pointcheval [21, 22] . In their scheme (called 3-round OAEP) decryption never rejects but returns a randomly looking message if a given ciphertext was not properly created with the encryption algorithm. Since no validity string is needed, the ciphertext overhead only depends on the randomness. As we shall discuss later, their security reduction however forces the ciphertext overhead to be oh = k r = 2t+ε bits because of a "quadratic term" q h q d /2 kr that appears in the success probability of their reduction. A more recent scheme in [12] suffers from the same problem. In summary, these schemes successfully eliminate the validity string but instead demand an extended randomness to prove IND-CCA security.
Encrypting long messages. The problem of getting optimal overhead becomes even more difficult when considering longer messages. Notice that all above schemes limit the messages to the size of the permutation minus the overhead. To encrypt long inputs, [3, 16] suggest to stretch the width of the Feistel network to cover the entire message and apply the permutation only to a part of the output. But no general and formal treatment has been given to this methodology and it is unclear if and how it affects the ciphertext overhead. Furthermore, for schemes that use several Feistel rounds, this approach is expensive in computation as every internal hash function has to deal with a long input or output. A number of methods for constructing hybrid encryption are available (e.g., [11, 7, 8, 1, 5] ), but they all increase the ciphertext overhead mainly because a one-time session-key is being encrypted.
Our Contribution
Our main contribution is an IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme with optimal ciphertext overhead based on arbitrary family of trapdoor one-way permutation in the random oracle model. We follow the validity-free approach of 3-round OAEP [21] but instead use a 4-round Feistel network. (See Figure 1 in Section 4 for a diagram.) We stress that the essential difference is not the increased number of rounds; it is rather the way we bind the message to the randomness in the first round of the Feistel network while most of OAEP variants separately input the message and the randomness. (See Section 1.3 for more intuition.)
Our contribution is mostly theoretical; Our scheme demonstrates that lower and upper bounds on the ciphertext overhead with respect to IND-CCA security can match up to a small additive constant in the random oracle model. The design approach that binds the message to the randomness and the security proof may be of technical interest, too. In practice, when implemented with an 1024-bit RSA permutation (80-bit security), our scheme encrypts 943-bit and longer messages while it is 863 bits for a known best scheme, which is at most 9% increase of the message space. Though such a t-bit saving may have limited practical impact in general, the scheme could find applications with edgy requirements in bandwidth.
We also introduce a novel method to securely combine simple passively secure symmetric encryption with the Feistel network to encrypt long messages while retaining the optimal ciphertext overhead. While the construction is interesting in that it suggests a new variant of a KEM that allows partial message recovery, it is interesting also in a theoretical sense as it illustrates the difference in the properties of the round functions in a 4-round Feistel network as it will be discussed later.
Technical Overview
Achieving Optimal Overhead. We explain the technical details in 3-round OAEP that seem to make it difficult to prove an optimal ciphertext overhead. The extended randomness of size k r ≥ 2t+ε stems from a quadratic term q h q d /2 k r in the success probability of the security reduction. Since an adversary running in time 2 t can make at most q h ≤ 2 t hash oracle queries and q d ≤ 2 t decryption queries, we must assume that
Where does this quadratic loss in the reduction actually come from? In the security proof, every time the simulated decryption oracle receives a ciphertext that was not legitimately generated by asking the random oracles, it returns a random plaintext. Later, it patches the hash table for the simulated randomness so that the hash output looks consistent. The patching fails if the randomness has already been asked to the random oracle. This happens with probability at most q h /2 k r since there are at most q h hash queries. Throughout the attack, there are at most q d decryption queries and hence the error probability of the patching is bounded by q h q d /2 k r .
Our main technical contribution is to provide a security analysis for our scheme where only linear terms of the form q h /2 k r or q d /2 k r appear. We overcome the problem observed in 3-round OAEP by feeding the randomness together with a part of the input message (say m 1 ) into the hash function, i.e., by computing H 1 (r m 1 ). This link between the randomness and the message allows the reduction to partition hash queries by m 1 and therefore reducing the error probability in patching the hash table to q h,m 1 /2 kr , where q h,m 1 is the number of hash queries with respect to m 1 . By summing up the probabilities for all m 1 returned from the decryption oracle, the error probability is bounded by Encrypting Long Messages. In order to encrypt long messages exceeding the size of the permutation (while retaining the optimal overhead), we incorporate the idea of the Tag-KEM/DEM framework [1] that allows to use a simple passively secure length-preserving symmetric cipher. The exceeding part of the message is encrypted with the symmetric cipher whose key is derived from the randomness used in the asymmetric part of encryption. The symmetric part is then tied to the asymmetric part of the ciphertext by feeding it back into one of the hash function used in the Feistel network. Conceptually, our approach is similar to Tag-KEMs with partial ciphertext recovery [5] but in our case the message can be directly recovered. Namely, the main part of our construction can be used as a Tag-KEM with partial message recovery. (We do not pursue this line in this paper due to the space limitation.)
A concrete technical difficulty is how and where to include the feedback from the symmetric part. Including it in the F-function (random oracle) in every round of the 4-round Feistel network should work but may be redundant. Is it then secure if the feedback is given only to one of the F-functions? Which one? [23] showed that the inner two rounds have different properties than the outer two ones. Does that also apply to our case? Our result shows that it is sufficient to give the feedback to one of the inner two hash functions. We remark that when including the feedback only in the outer hash functions then either our security proof does no longer hold or there is a concrete attack. We refer to Section 4.3 for further details.
Related Work
In Other Models. [21] constructed a simple scheme with optimal ciphertext overhead in the ideal full-domain permutation model. Looking at the construction and the security proof, however, one can see that the model is very strong and has little difference from idealizing the encryption function itself. Recently it is shown that ideal full-domain permutation can be constructed using random oracles [10] but the reduction is very costly and a tight reduction needed to retain the optimal overhead is highly unlikely. Note that [21] could only present a non-optimal scheme in the random oracle model, which shows the difficulty of achieving the optimality.
In the standard model, the IND-CCA secure schemes in [6, 17] have the shortest known ciphertext overhead consisting of two group elements which require an overhead of oh ≥ 4t + 2ε bits. It remains as a very interesting open question whether or not the optimality can be achieved without random oracles.
For Short Messages. Schemes based on general one-way permutations can never offer the optimal overhead for messages shorter than the size of the permutation. For the state of art in this issue, we refer to [2] which presents a scheme that offers non-optimal but oh ≥ 2t + ε that is currently the shortest overhead for messages of arbitrary (small) length. It is left as another open problem to construct a scheme with optimal overhead for arbitrary message size.
Lower Bound of Ciphertext Overhead
Formal Argument
Let PKE = (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. Public-key pk is associated with the message space M and the randomness space R used for encryption. For (pk , sk ) ← G(1 k ), let C(M ) for M ∈ M denote the set of ciphertexts that recover message M . To obtain a simple form of the lower bound, we restrict ourselves to PKE whose ciphertext overhead is independent of the public-key, message, and the randomness. Namely we assume that
is a fixed positive constant for any pk ∈ G(1 k ), M ∈ M and r ∈ R. We define such k oh as the ciphertext overhead with respect to k.
Let A be an adversary attacking the semantic security of PKE. We characterize the adversary by parameters t and ε in such a way that A runs in step 2 t and breaks the semantic security of PKE with advantage at most 2 ε . To study the relation between the adversary's ability and the ciphertext overhead, we treat t, ε independently from k and represent the bounds of the ciphertext overhead as a function k oh (t, ε). In the following argument, we count every encryption as one step. Later, we will discuss about this abstruction in more detail. Now consider the following generic attack launched by A. For a string c, let p(c) denote the probability that c = E pk (M 0 ; r) happens for uniformly chosen r. Similarly, let p (pk ) denote the probability that pk is selected by G(1 k ). The advantage of the adversary A with respect to pk is
Let η be the min-entropy with respect to the ciphertexts in
Since η ≤ k oh , we have
Since we require Adv A (k) ≤ 2 −ε , it holds that
for t, ε ≥ 1. Thus we have the lower bound:
The constant −1 is actually close to zero for reasonably large t and ε. If c ← E pk (M ; r) is bijective with respect to c and r, the adversary can search r one by one without duplication and the advantage for this case is Adv A,pk = 2 t 2 η , which results in k oh (t, ε) ≥ t + ε. The above argument counts encryption as one step. We use the same abstraction in our framework in more general form. That is, we count a fundamental cryptographic operation such as hashing, group operation, or encryption and decryption we are focusing on as one step of computation for the adversary. Hence 2 t is understood as the number of times that the adversary can perform the cryptographic operation in question. Precise assessment is always possible by incorporating scaling factors that represent exact number of steps decided by the target computation model for the cryptographic operations in question. The scaling factors may depend on k. It is important to note that, in this framework, we only consider the meaningful cases where all the scaling factors are independent from t and considerably small for the sake of efficiency of the encryption scheme. We thus wrap these constant factors as
in our arguments. This abstraction of computation provides the same ground in arguing the optimality of the overhead, and the resulting simple form of the lower bound is useful in showing the relation between the power of the adversary and the ciphertext overhead. If needed, one can always do more detailed assessment taking precise scaling factors into account.
Example : Ciphertext Overhead of OAEP
OAEP includes randomness of size k r and zero-padding of size k v . These parameters define the ciphertext overhead as oh = k r + k v . Together with the size of permutation n, they are provided as a security parameter k = (n, k r , k v ). According to [14, Th. 1] , the advantage of an adversary A making up to q decryption and hash queries is upper bounded by
where spd (n) is the probability of breaking set partial one-way property of the underlying permutation of size n, and c, c ≥ 1 are two small constants. Consider an (2 t , 2 −ε ) adversary that can make at most q ≤ 2 t oracle queries. Since parameter n can be chosen essentially independently from k r and k v , we can safely consider spd (n) small enough. Assuming spd (n) ≤ c 2 −ε with a constant 0 < c ≤ 1 2 for concreteness, each of the remaining two terms in (7) must be smaller than
must hold. Accordingly, in order to attain the desired security, it is sufficient to choose
plus small positive constants. As a result, the ciphertext overhead of OAEP is upper bounded by
Regarding the basic version of OAEP whose security is lowered to CPA by omitting zeropaddings, the ciphertext overhead k r = t + ε + O(1) is obtained in the same way based on its concrete security analysis shown as Th.13 of [4] .
Definitions
Public Key Encryption
We follow the standard definition of chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model. Let PKE = (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme where G, E, D are a key generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm, respectively. Let H denote the random oracle(s). Let A be an oracle machine that plays the following game.
(pk
Here, k is a security parameter and ρ is an internal state of A. Messages M 0 and M 1 must be in the same size and c * must not be asked to D sk in the final step. Let Adv 
Symmetric-key Encryption
Let SE k e = (E, D) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme where E is an encryption algorithm and D is a decryption algorithm and its key-space is {0, 1} ke . Let C be a machine that plays the following game.
Here, ρ is an internal state of C. Messages M 0 and M 1 must be in the same size. Let Adv For our construction, we require SE k e to be length-preserving where the length of a message and its ciphertext are the same. A simple one-time pad, whose key is generated through a pseudorandom number generator in practice, fulfills this requirement.
Trapdoor One-Way Permutations
Let P n be a family of trapdoor permutations over {0, 1} n . By (f, f −1 ) ← P n , we mean that a permutation f and its inverse function f −1 over {0, 1} n are efficiently and uniformly chosen. Both f and f −1 must be efficiently computable. The inverse function f −1 is called a trapdoor.
Let B be a machine that plays the following game.
By Adv owp B,P (n), we denote the probability ofX = X, which is taken over all the coin flips during the game. We say that P n is one-way if there exists a negligible function in n such that Adv owp B,P (n) ≤ holds for any adversary running in time τ .
Proposed Scheme
Our scheme requires symmetric-key encryption schemes and trapdoor permutation families as building blocks. The symmetric encryption schemes must be length-preserving and passively secure (indistinguishable against passive attacks), and the trapdoor permutation family must be one-way.
Description
We assume that a trapdoor one-way permutation family P n and a length-preserving symmetrickey encryption scheme SE k e = (E, D) are available, for n, k e ∈ N. Let k r ∈ N be a parameter that represents the size of randomness used for encryption. (These parameters are treated independently so that their individual impact to the ciphertext overhead can be explicitly stated. It is possible to treat them as functions of a single security parameter as usual.)
The proposed scheme PKE = (G, E, D) is as follows. See Figure 1 for graphical presentation. Also see Section 4.3 for a discussion about variants.
Key Generation G: Given a security parameter k = (n, k e , k r ) for n ≥ 6k r , set parameters k m 1 and k m 2 so that
are fulfilled. Then select (f, f −1 ) ← P n and hash functions G and H i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 such that
The private-key is f −1 . The public-key includes f , SE ke , and the hash functions with associated parameters.
Encryption E: Given a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} * , first chop it into three blocks, m 1 , m 2 , and m e such that
Then choose random r ← {0, 1} k r and compute 
and parse z = r m 1 ∈ {0, 1} k r × {0, 1} km 1 . The output is m 1 m 2 m e . 
Security and Optimality
km 2 × {0, 1} * and the randomness is r ∈ {0, 1} kr . The actual ciphertext is (u, c) where
The theorem is proven in Section 5.1. Note that the number of hash queries includes the ones made through decryption queries. In an asymptotic sense, Theorem 1 states that the above scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model if P is one-way and SE is passively secure.
As it is the case for most OAEP variants, our security reduction includes a quadratic factor q 2 h in the running time of the adversary against the one-way permutation. It results in demanding larger n which increases the minimal length of the message the scheme can encrypt attaining the optimal overhead. The approach from [18, 13] helps achieving a linear running time if desired.
Theorem 2 (Optimality in Ciphertext Overhead
holds for all adversaries C and B running in time 2 t , then k r = oh = t + ε + 4 is sufficient for messages of size equal or larger than n − k r bits.
A simple proof is shown in Section 5.3. Note that parameters k e and n are independent of the overhead and can be set arbitrary to fulfill the condition.
A Note on Variants
Why not 3 rounds? Consider the 3-round version of our scheme obtained by removing H 4 and simply letting t = d. We show that the 3-round version is not simulatable, at least with the technique that constructs a plaintext extractor from the queries to the random oracles.
Since the following argument holds regardless of the presence of the extended part c, let us ignore it. Observe that, if both h 2 = H 2 (v) and h 3 = H 3 (d) are asked, one can compute t = d, s = h 3 ⊕ v, u = f (t s). Thus we can simulate the decryption oracle for query u only by looking at these hash queries. On the other hand, if one of these hash queries are not asked, the decryption oracle has to return random m 1 m 2 .
Suppose that the adversary creates two ciphertexts, u and u as follows. Randomly choose t, s, t and compute s = H 3 (t) ⊕ s ⊕ H 3 (t ), u = f (t s), u = f (t s ). Clearly, they yield the same v as v = H 3 (t)⊕s = H 3 (t )⊕s . Apparently, the relation between u and u cannot be detected since H 2 (v) is not asked. Hence the decryption oracle returns random m 1 m 2 and m 1 m 2 to the decryption queries for u and u , respectively. Now, the adversary asks H 2 (v) and obtains h 2 . For consistency, it must hold that h 2 = (r m 1 ) ⊕ t = (r m 1 ) ⊕ t . However, since m 1 and m 1 are randomly chosen before the simulator sees t and t , such a relation is fulfilled only with negligible probability. The adversary can notice the inconsistency by checking the relation. Thus the simulation fails.
This shows the difficulty of 3-round design but does not show the impossibility. It is an interesting open problem to show whether it is indeed impossible or not.
Including c into a hash other than H 3 . We here discusses some variants obtained by including c into a hash function rather than H 3 . In summary, H 1 and H 4 are not the right place to input c.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that this variant is also secure.
. This is clearly a wrong choice since (u * , c * ) and (u * , c) yields the same m 1 .
Variant 3: H 4 (s c).
For this case, we can show that a (powerful) adversary can distinguish the simulation from the reality. The underlying idea is that, given a challenge ciphertext (u * , c * ), the adversary builds a ciphertext (u, c) that yields the same plaintext without asking to H 3 
Therefore, the selected challenge message is returned if (u, c) is asked to the real decryption oracle. However, since H 3 (d * ) has only been defined implicitly and never directly asked by the adversary, the simulated decryption oracle cannot detect such a case and returns a random message which is noticed by the adversary. Note that this attack is prevented by giving the feedback (also) to H 3 since c must be different from c * to have (u, c) different from (u * , c * ).
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
We follow the game based proof method [11] starting from the original CCA game as defined in Section 3.1. In the following, let X i denote the event that A outputsb = b in Game i.
Game 0. Let A be an adversary in the original CCA game. By definition, we have
Game 1. Modify the challenge oracle so that it returns random u * that is independent from the challenge messages as follows. 
Observe that the " − " events can only happen coincidentally due to the randomness of the hash outputs. Also observe that the " + " events happen, by definition, only if the previous event happens.
Thus we obtain
It is straightforward to see that distinguishing b breaks the passive security of the symmetric encryption since only the symmetric part is related to b in Game 1. We thus have:
for some suitable adversary C that has about the same running time as A. From (12), (13) , (14) , and (15), we obtain
It remains to estimate Pr[AskH + 3 ] which will be related to the advantage of breaking the one-way property of f . We initiate a new series of sub-games starting from Game 1, whose goal is a game where a reduction from causing AskH + 3 to breaking one-way property of f is trivial. In the following games, each random oracle is simulated with an independent list. Let L X denote the list for hash oracle X, which is initially empty. By b ← X(a) we mean that a is asked to oracle X and b is returned as output. When X is first asked on fresh input a, output b is uniformly selected and (a, b) is stored to L X . If a has been asked before, corresponding b is read from L X and returned. By (a, [b] ) ∈ L X , we mean that table L X includes an entry (α, β) where α = a. It also means that, if such an entry exists, β is referred as b. List L X is consistent for oracle X if every input a is unique in L X . 
This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 2
First note that k r is the only parameter that controls the ciphertext overhead in our scheme, i.e., oh = k r , for all messages of size equal or larger than n−k r bits. (For shorter messages the ciphertext overhead is no longer optimal.) Fix ε and t. We compute a bound on k r such that Adv cca A (k) ≤ 1/2 ε for adversaries A running time in 2 t . Using the explicit bound (25) from the proof of Theorem 1, it is sufficient to set k r so that Accordingly, oh = k r = t + ε + 4 is sufficient and it matches the lower bound up to the constant term as stated in the theorem.
Conclusion and Open Problems
We present a variant of OAEP that attains the optimal overhead in the random oracle model and thereby proved that the lower bound of the ciphertext overhead is tight even with respect to CCA security.
Open problems:
-Does the same bound hold without random oracles? Among some CCA-secure schemes without random oracles, the schemes [6, 17] have the shortest known overhead consisting of two group elements which require an overhead of oh ≥ 4t + 2ε. -Construct a scheme that encrypts very short messages with optimal overhead. Schemes based on general one-way permutations can never offer the optimal overhead for short messages. For the state of art in this issue, we refer to [2] whose scheme offers oh ≥ 2t + ε for messages of arbitrary (small) length. -Show 4-round is necessary (or not) in our construction. See Section 4.3 for discussion.
